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Abstract
Multichoice games have been introduced by Hsiao and Raghavan as a general-
ization of classical cooperative games. An important notion in cooperative game
theory is the core of the game, as it contains the rational imputations for players.
We propose two definitions for the core of a multichoice game, the first one is called
the precore and is a direct generalization of the classical definition. We show that
the precore coincides with the definition proposed by Faigle, and that the set of
imputations may be unbounded, which makes its application questionable. A sec-
ond definition is proposed, imposing normalization at each level, causing the core
to be a convex compact set. We study its properties, introducing balancedness and
marginal worth vectors, and defining the Weber set and the pre-Weber set. We
show that the classical properties of inclusion of the (pre)core into the (pre)-Weber
set as well as their coincidence in the convex case remain valid. A last section makes
a comparison with the core defined by van den Nouweland et al.
Keywords: multichoice game ; lattice ; core
1 Introduction
In cooperative game theory, one of the central problems is to select an efficient payoff
vector, i.e., a way of sharing among players the total worth of a game, if they all join the
grand coalition. There are two basic ways to do this. The first one is to define rational
axioms such a sharing should satisfy, e.g., the null or dummy player axioms, symmetry,
linearity, etc., with the hope that a unique sharing satisfies the set of axioms. This
leads to several definitions of values or solution concepts, the most famous ones being
the Shapley value [13] and the nucleolus [12]. The other way is to find a sharing so that
no subcoalition has interest to form, that is, the sum of individual payoffs of all players
for a given subcoalition is always greater or equal to the worth of this subcoalition. The
set of such payoff vectors, whenever they exist, is called the core of the game. Classical
results show under which conditions the core is nonempty, and give the structure of the
core when the game is convex. A related notion is the Weber set (see, e.g., [3]), which is
proven to always contain the core, with equality attained in case of convexity.
Many generalizations of the classical notion of cooperative game in characteristic form
have appeared the last decade, in order to model in a more accurate way real situations.
We may cite games with restricted cooperation of Faigle [5, 6], where admissible coalitions
should satisfy some precedence constraints, multichoice games of Hsiao and Raghavan
[10, 11], where each player is allowed to choose among a totally ordered set of actions,
fuzzy games [2] which can be considered as a continuous extension of multichoice games,
bi-cooperative games of Bilbao [1], where the worth of a coalition depends on whether
some remaining agents form an opponent coalition, etc. All these examples can be thought
as particular instances of games defined on a distributive lattice structure, see a general
exposition of this in [8, 9], and also Faigle and Kern [6].
A natural question is then to try to define the core of a game on a lattice, or of
some of the most useful examples cited above. In this paper, we focus on multichoice
games (Section 3), and propose a definition of the core and the Weber set. As it will
be shown in Section 4, the situation appears to be more complex than for the classical
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case, although similar results still hold. A first immediate generalization of the classical
definition leads to what we call the precore, which happens to be a convex polyhedron
with infinite directions. We propose to call core a particular convex compact subset of
it, satisfying some normalization constraint. Similarly to the classical case, we call pre-
Weber set the convex hull of the additive games induced by marginal worth vectors, and
the Weber set is a particular subset of it. We show that in case of convexity, we still have
equality between the core and the Weber set, and between the convex compact part of
the precore and the pre-Weber set. Moreover, the inclusion of the core into the Weber
set holds in any case, as well as the inclusion of the convex compact part of the precore
into the pre-Weber set.
We compare our results with previous works of Faigle and van den Nouweland et al.
in Section 5. We find that our precore is the core defined by Faigle [5]. The relation with
the core of van den Nouweland [14] appears to be less simple, since it is a subset of our
precore.
The interest of the definition of the core we propose is that it keeps the original
meaning of the set of payoff vectors such that no subcoalition can achieve more by itself,
subcoalition being here replaced by the more general notion of participation profile with
unequal levels of participation. Also, our solution possesses better and more natural
mathematical properties since they are very close to those of the classical case.
We begin by setting our notations and recall classical results in Section 2. Then
Section 3 presents the basic material for multichoice games. In Section 4, we give our
definitions of the core and the Weber set, and study their properties. Lastly, Section 5
compares our approach with previous works.
2 Background
Throughout this paper, we consider a finite set of players N := {1, . . . , n}. A (classical)
TU game on N is a function v : 2N → R such that v(∅) = 0. The set of classical TU
games on N is denoted by G(2N).
A game is said to be convex if v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ), for all S, T ⊆ N .
A game is said to be additive if v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) + v(T ), for all disjoint S, T ⊆ N . If
v is additive, it suffices to know only v({i}), i ∈ N . A game is said to be monotone if
v(S) ≤ v(T ), for all S, T ⊆ N such that S ⊆ T .
An n-dimensional real-valued vector φ ∈ Rn is called a payoff vector of a given game
v. In addition, if φ(N) :=
∑
i∈N φi = v(N), we call it an efficient payoff vector, or
pre-imputation. Note that an additive game uniquely defines a pre-imputation, and vice-
versa, hence the notation φ(N), or more generally φ(S) :=
∑
i∈S φi, S ⊆ N .
It is useful for the sequel to reconsider the above definitions in terms of lattices. We
begin by a short introduction on lattices. A a partially ordered set (P,≤) or a poset for
short, is a set P endowed with a binary relation ≤ satisfying reflexivity, antisymmetry
and transitivity. For any two element x, y ∈ P , we call x ∨ y the supremum of x and y if
it is the least element of all those greater than x and y, and x ∧ y the infimum of x and
y if it is the greatest element of all those less than x and y. The top element ⊤ of (P,≤)
is the greatest element of (P,≤), and the bottom element ⊥ of (P,≤) is the least element
of (P,≤). For any x, y ∈ P , x ∨ y, x ∧ y, ⊤ and ⊥ are unique whenever they exist. If
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for any x, y ∈ P , both x ∨ y and x ∧ y exist, the poset (P,≤) is called a lattice. For any
x, y ∈ (P,≤) such that x ≤ y, we define [x, y] := {z ∈ P | x ≤ z ≤ y}.
A classical TU game is a real-valued function defined on the lattice (2N ,⊆) (called a
Boolean lattice), vanishing at the bottom ⊥ = ∅ of the lattice. Union and intersection are
the sup ∨ and inf ∧ operations of the lattice, so that a general form of convexity writes
v(x ∨ y) + v(x ∧ y) ≥ v(x) + v(y). This is usually called supermodularity.
For any lattice (L,≤), a chain is a totally ordered sequence of elements of L, e.g.,
x < y < z < · · · . A chain is maximal if no superset of it is again a chain. In a finite
distributive lattice, maximal chains going from bottom ⊥ to top ⊤ have all the same
length, and are of the form ⊥ ≺ x ≺ y ≺ z ≺ · · · ≺ ⊤, where x ≺ y means that x < y
and there is no z ∈ L such that x < z < y (x is covered by y).
In the Boolean lattice (2N ,⊆), a maximal chain between ∅ and N is of the form
∅ ⊂ {i} ⊂ {i, j} ⊂ · · · ⊂ N , and hence is associated in a bijective way with a permutation
pi on N , defining the order in which elements i, j, . . . appear. We adopt the following
notation: for any permutation pi on N , we define the maximal chain
Api0 := ∅ ⊂ A
pi
1 := {pi(1)} ⊂ A
pi
2 := {pi(1), pi(2)} ⊂ · · · ⊂ A
pi
n := N
with Apii := {pi(1), . . . , pi(i)}. The marginal worth vector x
pi(v) is defined by:
xpipi(i)(v) := v(A
pi
i )− v(A
pi
i−1), i = 1, . . . , n.
The set of marginal worth vectors is denoted M(v). The ith coordinate represents the
marginal contribution of player i in the chain.
Let us remark that any marginal worth vector xpi is an efficient payoff vector, and
thus defines an additive game φpi by
φpi({i}) = xpii , ∀i ∈ N,
with the property that φpi(Apii ) = v(A
pi
i ), i = 0, . . . , n.
The Weber set of v is the convex hull of the set of marginal worth vectors
W(v) := co(M(v)).
For any convex set C, we denote by Ext(C) the set of its extreme points (vertices).
A collection B of nonempty subsets of N is balanced if there exist positive coefficients
µ(S), S ∈ B, such that ∑
S∋i
µ(S) = 1, ∀i ∈ N.
Any partition {P1, . . . , Pk} of N is a balanced collection, with coefficients µ(Pi) = 1, ∀i.
A game v is balanced if for every balanced collection B with coefficients µ(S), S ∈ B, it
holds ∑
S∈B
µ(S)v(S) ≤ v(N).
The core of v is a set of efficient payoff vectors such that no subcoalition can achieve
more by itself:
C(v) := {φ ∈ Rn | φ(N) = v(N) and φ(A) ≥ v(A), ∀A ⊆ N}
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with φ(A) :=
∑
i∈A φi. Equivalently, it is the set of additive games greater than v and
coinciding on N . Whenever nonempty, the core is a convex set. It is reduced to the
singleton {v} if the game is additive.
The following proposition summarizes well-known results.
Proposition 1 Let v be a game on N . The following holds.
• (i) C(v) ⊆ W(v).
• (ii) C(v) 6= ∅ if and only if v is balanced.
• (iii) v is convex if and only if Ext(C(v)) =M(v), or equivalently C(v) =W(v).
3 Games on lattices and multichoice games
We give a brief introduction to games defined on lattices (see [8, 9] for a more detailed
presentation). We consider again a set of players N := {1, . . . , n}. Let L1, . . . , Ln be
finite distributive lattices representing the partially ordered set of actions each player
can perform, and consider their product L := L1 × · · · × Ln, together with the product
order, i.e., for x := (x1, . . . , xn), y := (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ L, x ≤ y iff xi ≤ yi for i = 1, . . . , n.
Supremum and infimum are also defined coordinatewise. The top and bottom of L are
denoted ⊤,⊥.
A game on L is any function v : L→ R such that v(⊥) = 0. We denote by G(L) the
set of games on L. Specifically, Li is the ordered set of possible actions player i has at
his disposal. The bottom element of Li indicates no participation to the game by player
i, while the top element indicates full participation. A given x ∈ L is then a profile of
participation of all players, indicating for each player the action chosen. This replaces
the notion of coalition.
We give some examples, to recover known concepts. Classical cooperative games
correspond to Li = {0, 1} for all i ∈ N , “0” indicating no participation and “1” full par-
ticipation; hence L is the Boolean lattice 2N . Multichoice games of Hsiao and Raghavan
correspond to Li = {0, 1, . . . , l} for all i ∈ N , where 1, 2, . . . , l are the ordered participa-
tion levels of a player. Bi-cooperative games may correspond to the case Li = {0, 1, 2},
i ∈ N , where “0” corresponds to participation against, “2” to participation in favor,
and “1” no participation, although a better notation would be Li = {−1, 0, 1}. In fact,
bi-cooperative games, as well as ternary voting games of Felsenthal and Machover [7],
correspond to the simplest case of bipolar games, as defined by Grabisch in [8], and are
not isomorphic to multichoice games with l = 2 (this point is however out of the scope
of this paper).
In this paper, we focus on multichoice games; however our definition is slightly more
general than the original one of Hsiao and Raghavan.
Definition 1 Let Li := {0, 1, 2, . . . , li} endowed with the natural order, i ∈ N , and
consider the product lattice L = L1 × · · · × Ln. A multichoice game is any function
v : L → R such that v(0, 0, . . . , 0) = 0. A l-choice game is a multichoice game where
l1 = l2 = · · · = ln =: l.
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Note that (0, 0, . . . , 0) is the bottom element ⊥ of L, and “0” denotes non participation.
The top element of L is denoted ⊤ := (l1, . . . , ln) as usual. Any x := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ L
is a participation profile, indicating the participation level of each player. We recall that
(see above):
x ≤ y ⇔ x1 ≤ y1 and x2 ≤ y2 and · · · and xn ≤ yn
x ∨ y := (x1 ∨ y1, . . . , xn ∨ yn)
x ∧ y := (x1 ∧ y1, . . . , xn ∧ yn).
We will use sometimes the notation (x−i, ki) to denote the participation profile where
player i plays at level k ∈ Li, and other players play at levels defined by the participation
profile x ∈ L. We put for convenience x−i ∈ L−i :=
∏
j 6=i Lj . A particular case is the
situation where the i-th player plays at the k-th action level, k > 0, the others doing
nothing, which is denoted by (0−i, ki).
In multichoice games, a payoff vector is defined for any player participating at any
level. Following van den Nouweland et al. [14], we introduceM := {(i, k) | i ∈ N, k ∈ Li},
so that a payoff vector φ is an element of RM , whose coordinates are denoted by φ(i,k),
with the convention φ(i,0) = 0, ∀i ∈ N . Similarly to the classical case, we put for any
x ∈ L
φ(x) :=
∑
i∈N
φ(i,xi). (1)
For convenience, we also introduce M∗ := {(i, k) | i ∈ N, k ∈ Li \ {0}}. Evidently, any
vector in RM
∗
defines a payoff vector, and vice-versa. Simlarly, a payoff vector could be
considered as an alement of R
P
j∈N lj .
We denote by Cm(L) the set of maximal chains of the lattice L. Its cardinality is
known to be (see, e.g., Faigle and Kern [6])
|Cm(L)| =
(l1 + l2 + · · ·+ ln)!
l1!l2! · · · ln!
. (2)
Next definitions follow those for games on (general) lattices.
Definition 2 Let v be a multichoice game on L. Then
(i) v is monotone if x ≤ y implies v(x) ≤ v(y).
(ii) v is convex if v(x ∨ y) + v(x ∧ y) ≥ v(x) + v(y), for all x, y ∈ L.
(iii) v is additive if for every x, y ∈ L such that x∧y = ⊥, it holds v(x∨y) = v(x)+v(y).
Proposition 2 A game v is additive if and only if for all x ∈ L, v(x) =
∑n
i=1 vi(xi)
holds, with vi : Li −→ R, and vi(k) := v(0−i, ki), for all i ∈ N and k ∈ Li.
Proof: Assuming additivity of v, we have v(0−{i,j}, ki, k
′
j) = vi(k) + vj(k
′). Hence, by
repeating this process, we finally get for any x ∈ L, v(x) =
∑n
i=1 vi(xi).
Reciprocally, if v can be written under the above form, then it is additive since taking
x, y ∈ L such that x∧ y = ⊥ implies that for each i ∈ N , either xi = 0i or yi = 0i. Hence
v(x ∨ y) = v(x) + v(y) holds. 
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Remark 1:
1. Proposition 2 shows the equivalence, as in the classical case, between
payoff vectors and additive games. It justifies the notation φ(x) intro-
duced in (1).
2. The concepts introduced in Def. 2 remain applicable for games on any
lattice L =
∏n
i=1 Li. However, Proposition 2 does not hold in general.
Hence, the correspondence between payoff vectors and additive games
may be lost.
4 The core and Weber set of multichoice games
The following definition is a direct transposition of the classical definition of the core for
TU games.
Definition 3 The precore of a multichoice game v on L is defined by
PC(v) := {φ ∈ RM | φ(x) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ L, and φ(⊤) = v(⊤)}.
Note that any φ ∈ PC(v) is an efficient payoff vector (or additive game by Remark
1). Clearly, the precore is a convex set. Let us consider the following example as an
illustration.
Example 1: We consider a 2-choice game with two players, hence L :=
{0, 1, 2}2. The conditions on φ to be element of the precore write:
(2, 2) = φ(1,2) + φ(2,2) = v(2, 2)
φ(2, 0) = φ(1,2) ≥ v(2, 0)
φ(0, 2) = φ(2,2) ≥ v(0, 2)
φ(1, 1) = φ(1,1) + φ(2,1) ≥ v(1, 1)
φ(1, 0) = φ(1,1) ≥ v(1, 0)
φ(0, 1) = φ(2,1) ≥ v(0, 1).
Remark that φ(1, 0) and φ(0, 1) may be taken arbitrarily large. This shows that in general,
PC(v) is an unbounded convex polyhedron, hence it can be written as the Minkovski sum
of a polytope PCF (v) := co(Ext(PC(v))) and a cone (see, e.g., Ziegler [16]).
This is not acceptable since individual payoff vectors of some players may become
infinite. This drawback could be avoided if normalization occurs not only on the last
level, i.e., φ(⊤) = v(⊤), but also on each level 1, 2, . . . , l. This motivates the next
definition.
Definition 4 The core of a multichoice game v on L is defined as:
C(v) := {φ ∈ RM | φ(x) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ L,
and φ(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln) = v(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln), k = 1, . . . ,max
j
lj}.
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Note that the precore always contains the core. For l-choice games, the normalization
condition simplifies into φ(k, k, . . . , k) = ν(k, k, . . . , k), k = 1, . . . , l. Obviously the core
is a convex set, where all variables are bounded, hence it is a convex polytope.
We give an interpretation of the definition. A given x ∈ L represents the profile
of participation of all players, supposed to achieve a common task, so that x could be
thought of as a team of players with different participation levels. A basic requirement
for the task to be achieved properly is that all players of the team should have equal level
of participation (this is a kind of fairness condition: no one works less than the others),
and ideally, this level of participation should be as high as possible, despite the fact that
players may have the tendency to play at the lowest possible level (the less work, the
better). If the core of v is nonempty, it is possible to achieve this goal by rewarding
players with a payoff φ ∈ C(v).
Let us explain this with the simple case of a 2-choice game v on N . If everybody plays
at level 2, the total amount to share is v(2, 2, . . . , 2), and any player i ∈ N will receive
φ(i,2). There is no interest to have a profile of participation x mixing levels 2, 1 and 0
(including at least one player at level 2), since φ(x) ≥ v(x) for all such profiles.
Suppose now that nobody wants to play at level 2, but at most at level 1. Then
φ favors the formation of the profile (1, 1, . . . , 1), and in this case the total value to be
shared is v(1, 1, . . . , 1), hence the normalization condition.
Lastly, suppose that v is monotonic. Then v(2, 2, . . . , 2) ≥ v(1, 1, . . . , 1), so that the
total amount shared by players will be higher if they play at level 2 rather than at level
1. Hence, in case of monotonicity, our definition of the core is an incentive to play at the
highest level.
We introduce now balancedness for the core and precore. A collection B of elements
of L \ {⊥} is pre-balanced if there exist positive coefficients µ(x), x ∈ B, such that
∑
x∈B|xi=li
µ(x) = 1, for all i ∈ N,
∑
x∈B|xi=k
µ(x) = 0, for all k = 1, . . . , li − 1, i ∈ N.
Example 2: Let n = 4 and l1 = l2 = l3 = l4 = 3. The following is a
pre-balanced collection
B = {(3, 3, 3, 0), (0, 3, 3, 3), (3, 0, 0, 3)},
with coefficients µ(3, 3, 3, 0) = µ(0, 3, 3, 3) = µ(3, 0, 0, 3) = 0.5.
Definition 5 A multi-choice game v is pre-balanced if for every pre-balanced collection
B of elements of L \ {⊥} with coefficients µ(x), x ∈ B, it holds
∑
x∈B
µ(x)v(x) ≤ v(⊤).
Proposition 3 A multi-choice game has a nonempty precore if and only if it is pre-
balanced.
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Proof: Nonemptiness of the precore is equivalent to find a payoff vector φ ∈ RM
∗
such
that ∑
i∈N,xi>0
φ(i,xi) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ L, and φ(⊤) =
∑
i∈N
φ(i,li) = v(⊤),
which in turn is equivalent to the fact that the following linear program
min z =
∑
i∈N
φ(i,li) subject to
∑
i∈N,xi>0
φ(i,xi) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ L
has an optimal solution with value z∗ ≤ v(⊤). Indeed, any optimal solution is such that∑
i∈N φ(i,li) = v(⊤), and so lies in the precore. Conversely, any φ in the precore satisfies
the contraints, and is such that φ(⊤) = v(⊤). Hence z∗ ≤ v(⊤) is true.
Its dual problem is
max
µ
q =
∑
x∈L
µ(x)v(x) subject to
µ(x) ≥ 0, x ∈ L∑
x−i∈L−i
µ(x−i, li) = 1, i ∈ N
∑
x−i∈L−i
µ(x−i, ki) = 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ li − 1, i ∈ N.
By the duality theorem, z∗ = q∗ ≤ v(⊤). Hence, nonemptiness of the precore is equivalent
to the existence of an optimal solution µ∗ such that
∑
x∈L µ
∗(x)v(x) ≤ v(⊤) and satisfying
the constraints, which means exactly that v is pre-balanced. 
A collection B of elements of L \ {⊥} is balanced if there exist positive coefficients
µ(x), x ∈ B, such that
∑
x∈B|xi=li
µ(x) = (max
j
lj)− li + 1, for all i ∈ N,
∑
x∈B|xi=k
µ(x) = 1, for all k = 1, . . . , li − 1, i ∈ N.
Remark that for l-choice games, the above two conditions simplify into
∑
x∈B|xi=k
µ(x) =
1, for all k = 1, . . . , l and i ∈ N .
Example 3: Let us take as before n = 4 and l1 = l2 = l3 = l4 = 3. The
following is a balanced collection
B = {(2, 0, 3, 1), (1, 2, 0, 0), (0, 1, 2, 2), (2, 3, 3, 1),
(2, 0, 3, 1), (3, 0, 1, 3), (0, 1, 0, 2), (0.3, 2, 0)}
with µ(2, 0, 3, 1) = 0.5, µ(1, 2, 0, 0) = µ(3, 0, 1, 3) = 1, µ(0, 1, 2, 2) = µ(2, 3, 3, 1) =
µ(2, 0, 3, 1) = 0.25, µ(0, 1, 0, 2) = µ(0.3, 2, 0) = 0.75.
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Definition 6 A multichoice game v is balanced if for every balanced collection B of
elements of L \ {⊥} with coefficients µ(x), x ∈ B, it holds
∑
x∈B
µ(x)v(x) ≤
maxj lj∑
k=1
v(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln)
Proposition 4 A multichoice game has a nonempty core if and only if it is balanced.
Proof: The proof is similar to the one of Prop. 3. Nonemptiness of the core is equivalent
to finding a payoff vector φ ∈ RM
∗
such that
∑
i∈N,xi>0
φ(i,xi) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ L, and φ(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln) =
∑
i∈N
φ(i,k∧li) = v(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln), ∀k = 1, . . . ,max
j
lj ,
which is equivalent to the fact that the following linear program:
min z =
∑
i∈N
[ ∑
1≤k<li
φ(i,ki) + ((max
j
lj)− li + 1)φ(i,li)
]
subject to
∑
i∈N,xi>0
φ(i,xi) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ L,
has an optimal solution z∗ ≤
∑maxj lj
k=1 v(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln). Its dual problem is
max
µ
q =
∑
x∈L
µ(x)v(x) subject to
µ(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ L∑
x−i∈L−i
µ(x−i, li) = (max
j
lj)− li + 1, i ∈ N
∑
x−i∈L−i
µ(x−i, ki) = 1, k = 1, . . . , li − 1, ∀i ∈ N.
The existence of an optimal solution is equivalent to the fact that v is balanced. 
Consider a maximal chain C := {x0 := ⊥ < x1 < · · · < x
Pn
j=1 lj := ⊤} in L. Let
us remark that between xi−1 and xi, only one coordinate has changed, and has been
increased by exactly 1. Hence, to each maximal chain one can associate the mapping
σ : {1, . . . ,
∑
j lj} → M
∗, defined by σ(i) = (j, k), k ∈ Lj \ {0}, which means that at the
ith element of the chain, the level of player j has been raised from k−1 to k, in symbols:
xi = xi−1 ∨ (0−j, kj).
Assimilating (j, k) to (0−j, kj), one can write x
i =
∨i
p=1 σ(p), for any element of the
chain. Note that all mappings σ (which are in fact permutations on {1, . . . ,
∑
j lj}) may
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not correspond to a maximal chain. For this, σ must fulfill: (j, k′) > (j, k) implies i′ > i,
where σ(i) := (j, k) and σ(i′) := (j, k′) (multipermutation).
We define the marginal worth vector ψC ∈ RM
∗
associated to C and v as:
ψC(j,k) := v(x
σ−1(j,k))− v(xσ
−1(j,k)−1), ∀(j, k) ∈M∗.
From this, we define the payoff vector φC ∈ RM by:
φC(j,k) :=
k∑
p=1
ψC(j,p), j ∈ N, k ∈ Lj \ {0},
and φC(j,0) = 0, ∀j ∈ N . The set of all such payoff vectors φ
C for all maximal chains is
denoted by PM(v).
A fundamental property of φC is that it coincides with v on C.
Lemma 1 Let C be a maximal chain on L. For every x ∈ C, φC(x) = v(x).
Proof: Consider a maximal chain C := {x0 := ⊥ < x1 < · · · < x
Pn
j=1 lj := ⊤} in L, and
its associated mapping σ. Assume x = (k1, . . . , kn), σ(i) := (j, k). We have:
φC(j,k) =
k∑
p=1
ψC(j,p) =
k∑
p=1
[v(xσ
−1(j,p))− v(xσ
−1(j,p)−1)],
and
φC(x) =
n∑
j=1
φC(j,k) =
n∑
j=1
k∑
p=1
ψC(j,p) =
n∑
j=1
[
k∑
p=1
[v(xσ
−1(j,p))− v(xσ
−1(j,p)−1)]]
= v(xσ
−1(j,k)) = v(x).

Definition 7 The pre-Weber set PW(v) of v is defined as the convex hull of all payoff
vectors in PM(v):
PW(v) := co(PM(v)).
Theorem 1 If a multichoice game v is convex, then any payoff vector in PM(v) is a
vertex of the precore:
PM(v) ⊆ Ext(PC)(v).
Proof: Let C := {x0 := ⊥ < x1 < · · · < x
Pn
j=1 lj := ⊤} be a maximal chain in L, and
consider φC .
We first show that φC ∈ PC(v). We take any x ∈ L and show that φC(x) ≥ v(x). By
Lemma 1, the property is true for any x ∈ C, so let us suppose x 6∈ C. Then there exists
a unique i such that xi+1 > x and xi 6> x. Moreover, there exists a unique j ∈ N such
that xi+1j = xj and x
i
j = xj − 1, where xj is the jth coordinate of x. In summary, we
have the following situation:
11
rxi ∧ x = {x1, . . . , xj − 1, . . . , xn}
rxi = {xi+1
1
, . . . , x
i+1
j−1
, xj − 1, x
i+1
j+1
. . . , xi+1n }rx = {x1, . . . , xj, . . . , xn}
rxi+1 = {xi+1
1
, . . . , x
i+1
j−1
, xj, x
i+1
j+1
. . . , xi+1n }
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
By convexity of v, we have
v(xi+1)− v(xi) ≥ v(x)− v(xi ∧ x). (3)
Note that if xi ∧ x ∈ C, we are done since φC ≡ v on C, so that the above inequality
writes φC(xi+1) − φC(xi) ≥ v(x) − φC(xi ∧ x). By definition of φC , we have φC(x) =
φC(xi+1)− φC(xi) + φC(xi ∧ x), which leads to φC(x) ≥ v(x).
If xi ∧ x 6∈ C, we construct a decreasing sequence x′, x′′, . . . which will meet the chain
C. Specifically, let us consider x′ := xi ∧ x, and i′ such that xi
′+1 > x′ and xi
′
6> x′. The
same inequality as (3) holds with x′, i′ replacing x, i. If xi
′
∧ x′ ∈ C, the result can be
proven as above. Indeed, we get:
v(xi+1)− v(xi) ≥ v(x)− v(xi ∧ x)
v(xi
′+1)− v(xi
′
) ≥ v(xi ∧ x)− v(xi
′
∧ xi ∧ x).
Summing the inequalities leads to
v(xi+1)− v(xi) + v(xi
′+1)− v(xi
′
) ≥ v(x)− v(xi
′
∧ xi ∧ x)
which is equivalent to
φC(xi+1)− φC(xi) + φC(xi
′+1)− φC(xi
′
) ≥ v(x)− φC(xi
′
∧ xi ∧ x). (4)
By definition of φC
φC(x′) = φC(xi
′+1) + φC(xi
′
∧ xi ∧ x)− φC(xi
′
)
φC(x) = φC(xi+1) + φC(x′)− φC(xi)
so that
φC(x) = φC(xi+1) + φC(xi
′+1) + φC(xi
′
∧ xi ∧ x)− φC(xi
′
)− φC(xi).
Replacing into (4) leads to φC(x) ≥ v(x).
If xi
′
∧ x′ 6∈ C , we consider x′′ := xi
′
∧ x′ and i′′ accordingly. Clearly the sequence
x, x′, x′′, . . . is strictly decreasing and will meet the chain C due to finiteness of L, latest
at bottom of L since ⊥ ∈ C. Repeating the above process proves that φC(x) ≥ v(x),
∀x ∈ L.
It remains to show that φC is a vertex of the precore. Suppose there exist payoff
vectors φ1, φ2 6= φ
C ∈ PC(v), and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that φC = λφ1 + (1 − λ)φ2. Because
we have φC(xi) = v(xi) for any xi ∈ C, we have v(xi) = λφ1(x
i) + (1 − λ)φ2(x
i). But
φk(x
i) ≥ v(xi) for all xi ∈ C, k = 1, 2, hence necessarily φ1(x
i) = φ2(x
i) = v(xi), i.e.,
φ1 = φ2 = φ
C , a contradiction. 
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Definition 8 A restricted maximal chain Cr = {x
0 := ⊥ < x1 < · · · < x
Pn
i=1 li := ⊤} in
L is a maximal chain passing by all (k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln), k = 1, . . . ,maxj lj. The set of all
restricted maximal chains is denoted by Crm(L).
Proposition 5 Suppose l1 ≤ l2 · · · ≤ ln. The number of restricted maximal chains is
given by:
|Crm(L)| = (n!)
l1 × ((n− 1)!)l2−l1 × · · · × (1!)ln−ln−1
= nl1(n− 1)l2 · · · 1ln.
If l1 = l2 = · · · = ln =: l (l-choice game), then |C
r
m(L)| = (n!)
l.
Proof: Let us first prove the statement for l-choice games. Any restricted maximal
chain has the form {(0, . . . , 0), x1, . . . , (1, . . . , 1), xn+1, . . . , (2, . . . , 2), x2n+1, . . . , (l, . . . , l)}.
Between (k, . . . , k) and (k + 1, . . . , k + 1), for k = 0, . . . , l − 1, there are n! maximal
chains since the sublattice [(k, . . . , k), (k+1, . . . , k+1)] is the Boolean lattice 2N . Hence,
|Crm(L)| = (n!)
l.
We turn to the general case. Any restricted maximal chain has the form
{⊥, x1, . . . , (l1, . . . , l1), x
l1n+1, . . . , (l1, l2, . . . , l2), x
l1+l2(n−1)+1, . . . , (l1, l2, l3, . . . , l3), . . . ,
(l1, . . . , ln)}. In L, the sublattice [⊥, (l1, . . . , l1)] := {x ∈ L | ⊥ ≤ x ≤ (l1, . . . , ln)}
corresponds to a l1-choice game with n players, hence the number of restricted maximal
chains is (n!)l1 . The sublattice [(l1, . . . , l1), (l1, l2, . . . , l2)] corresponds to a (l2− l1)-choice
game with n−1 players, hence it has ((n−1)!)l2−l1 restricted maximal chains. Continuing
the process till the sublattice [(l1, . . . , ln−1, ln−1), (l1, . . . , ln)] proves the formula. 
The marginal worth vector ψCr associated to a restricted chain Cr is defined as before,
as well as the associated payoff vector φCr . Note that φCr ≡ v on Cr still holds. The set
of payoff vectors φCr for all restricted maximal chains is denoted M(v).
Restricted marginal worth vectors will play a central role in the sequel. Note that
for any participation profile of a restricted maximal chain, the difference of levels of
participation among players does not exceed 1. In other words, if player i at level k − 1
want to reach level k, he must wait till all other players have reached level k − 1.
Definition 9 The Weber set is defined as the convex hull of all payoff vectors φCr :
W(v) := co(M(v)).
Theorem 2 If a multichoice game v is convex, then any payoff vector in M(v) is a
vertex of the core:
M(v) ⊆ Ext(C)(v).
Proof: Consider a restricted maximal chain Cr and its associated payoff vector φ
Cr .
We know by Th. 1 that it is a vertex of the precore, and since φCr coincides with v on
Cr, it has the property φ
Cr(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln) = v(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln), k = 1, . . . ,maxj lj ,
hence it belongs to the core and is a vertex of it. 
As a corollary of Th. 1 and 2, we obtain:
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Corollary 1 Let v be a convex multichoice game. Then
1. PW(v) ⊆ PCF (v)
2. W(v) ⊆ C(v)
Our aim is now to study the inclusion of the core in the Weber set, like in the classical
case.
Theorem 3 For any multichoice game v, the polytope of the precore is included in the
pre-Weber set, i.e, PCF (v) ⊆ PW(v).
The proof relies on the following lemmas.
Lemma 2 Let φ, y be two vectors in R
P
j lj , and φ be considered as a payoff vector. Then
their inner product is:
φ · y =
P
j lj∑
i=1
φ(xi)(Yσ(i) − Yσ(i+1))
for any maximal chain {x0 := ⊥, x1, x2, . . . ,⊤} and corresponding mapping σ, and Y(j,k) :=∑lj
p=k y(j,p), for all (j, k) ∈M
∗, and Yσ(
P
j lj+1)
:= 0.
Proof: We have, letting σ(i) := (j(i), k(i)):
P
j lj∑
i=1
φ(xi)(Yσ(i) − Yσ(i+1)) =
P
j lj∑
i=1
Yσ(i)(φ(x
i)− φ(xi−1))
=
P
j lj∑
i=1
( lj(i)∑
p=k(i)
y(j(i),p)
)(
φ(j(i),k(i)) − φ(j(i),k(i)−1)
)
(φ is a payoff vector)
=
P
j lj∑
i=1
φ(j(i),k(i))
( lj(i)∑
p=k(i)
y(j(i),p) −
lj(i)∑
p=k(i)+1
y(j(i),p)
)
=
P
j lj∑
i=1
φ(j(i),k(i))y(j(i),k(i))
=
P
j lj∑
i=1
φσ(i)yσ(i) = φ · y.

Lemma 3 Given any y ∈ R
P
j lj , there exists a maximal chain with corresponding map-
ping σ such that Yσ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ Yσ(Pj lj).
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Proof: We partition {1, . . . ,
∑
j lj} into n disjoint intervals Ii := [
∑i
j=1 lj + 1,
∑i+1
j=1 lj],
i = 0, . . . , n− 1, corresponding to the levels in L1, . . . , Ln. In each interval Ii, compute
Yk :=
Pi+1
j=1 lj∑
p=k
yp, k ∈ Ii.
Take a permutation pi such that Ypi(1) ≥ · · · ≥ Ypi(Pj lj). Then if pi(k) ∈ Ii, put σ(k) :=
(i + 1, p), where p is the first level in Li+1 not already chosen, and put Yσ(k) := Ypi(k).
Then by construction σ is compatible with a chain, and Yσ(i) is non increasing with i. 
Example 4: We illustrate Lemma 3. Let n = 2 and l1 = 2, l2 = 3,
and consider y = (0.1, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3, 0.2). The partition of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} gives
{{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}}. Hence the computation of Y gives Y = (0.8, 0.7, 1, 0.5, 0.2),
and we get:
σ(1) = 12, σ(2) = 11, σ(3) = 21, σ(4) = 22, σ(5) = 32,
which defines the maximal chain {(0, 1), (1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3)}. We have
effectively Yσ(1) = Y12 = 0.5+0.3+0.2 = 1, Yσ(2) = Y11 = 0.1+0.7 = 0.8, etc.
Let us now prove Th. 3. Our proof uses the separation theorem for closed convex
sets, similarly to the proof of Derks for proving the inclusion of the (classical) core into
the Weber set [4].
Proof: Suppose there exists a payoff vector φ in PCF (v), but not belonging to the
pre-Weber set. By the separation theorem, it should exist y ∈ R
P
j lj such that for any
payoff vector φ′ in the pre-Weber set, φ · y < φ′ · y.
Let us consider such a y and φ. Then, for any maximal chain and corresponding
mapping σ, using Lemma 2, we get:
φ · y =
P
j lj∑
i=1
φ(xi)(Yσ(i) − Yσ(i+1)).
Let us choose a maximal chain C with mapping σ such that Yσ(i) − Yσ(i+1) ≥ 0, i =
1, . . . ,
∑
j lj. This is always possible by Lemma 3. Considering that φ is in the precore,
and that the payoff vector φC in the pre-Weber set satisfies φC ≡ v on C, we deduce:
φ · y ≥
P
j lj∑
i=1
v(xi)(Yσ(i) − Yσ(i+1))
=
P
j lj∑
i=1
φC(xi)(Yσ(i) − Yσ(i+1)),
a contradiction. Hence, PCF (v) is included in PW(v). 
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Theorem 4 For any multichoice game v, the core is included in the Weber set, i.e.,
C(v) ⊆ W(v).
We need the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Given any y ∈ R
P
j lj , there exists a restricted maximal chain {⊥, x1, x2, . . . ,⊤}
with corresponding mapping σr such that Yσr(i) − Yσr(i+1) ≥ 0, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,
∑
j lj}
such that xi and xi+1 belong to the sublattice [((k−1)∧l1, . . . , (k−1)∧ln), (k∧l1, . . . , k∧ln)],
xi 6= ((k − 1) ∧ l1, . . . , (k − 1) ∧ ln) for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,maxj lj}.
Proof: Given y, by Lemma 3, there exists a maximal chain C in L with mapping σ such
that Y is non increasing along it. It is easy to build a restricted maximal chain Cr from
C so that the above condition is satisfied: starting from ⊥, put σr(1) := 1j = σ(1), then
σr(2) = 1j′ if σ
−1(1j′) < σ
−1(1k) for all k 6= j, j
′, and so on till Cr is defined in the first
sublattice [⊥, (1, 1, . . . , 1)]. Then from (1, . . . , 1) proceed similarly, i.e., σr(n + 1) = 2j if
σ−1(2j) < σ
−1(2k) for all k 6= j, etc. 
Example 5: Let n = 2, l1 = 3, l2 = 4, and consider y defined below.
(i, k) (1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4)
y(i,k) 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.2
Y(i,k) 0.8 0.7 0.1 1.7 1.4 0.9 0.2
Then the corresponding maximal chain is defined by:
σ(1) = (2, 1), σ(2) = (2, 2), σ(3) = (2, 3), σ(4) = (1, 1), σ(5) = (1, 2),
σ(6) = (2, 4), σ(7) = (1, 3).
Applying Lemma 4, we find the following maximal restricted chain:
σr(1) = (2, 1), σr(2) = (1, 1), σr(3) = (2, 2), σr(4) = (1, 2), σr(5) = (2, 3),
σr(6) = (1, 3), σr(7) = (2, 4).
One can verify that
Y(2,1) = 1.7 ≥ Y(1,1) = 0.8,
Y(2,2) = 1.4 ≥ Y(1,2) = 0.7,
Y(2,3) = 0.9 ≥ Y(1,3) = 0.1,
Y(2,4) = 0.2,
as expected.
Proof: (of Th. 4) We use the same technique as for Th. 3. Assume φ ∈ C(v) \
W(v). Then it should exist y ∈ R
P
j lj such that for any element φ′ in the Weber set,
φ · y < φ′ · y. Considering such a y, we know by Lemma 4 that there exists a restricted
maximal chain Cr with corresponding mapping σr such that Y is non increasing on each
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sublattice [((k − 1) ∧ l1, . . . , (k − 1) ∧ ln), (k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln)], except its bottom element
((k − 1) ∧ l1, . . . , (k − 1) ∧ ln). Let us decompose φ · y as follows:
φ · y =
P
j lj∑
i=1
φiyi =
maxj lj∑
k=1
n(k)∑
i=1
φPk−1
j=1 n(j)+i
yPk−1
j=1 n(j)+i
where n(k) = |{j | k ∧ lj = k}|, i.e., we have decomposed the sum according to the
different levels. In each term of the right hand, we apply Lemma 2. This gives:
φ · y =
maxj lj∑
k=1
[ n(k)−1∑
i=1
φ(x
Pk−1
j=1 n(j)+i)(Yσr(
Pk−1
j=1 n(j)+i)
− Yσr(
Pk−1
j=1 n(j)+i+1)
)
+ φ(x
Pk
j=1 n(j))(Yσr(
Pk
j=1 n(j))
− Yσr(
Pk
j=1 n(j)+1)
)
]
.
Observe that x
Pk
j=1 n(j) = (k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln) by definition of Cr. Since φ ∈ C(v) implies
that φ(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln) = v(k ∧ l1, . . . , k ∧ ln), and by Lemma 4 it follows that
φ · y ≥
maxj lj∑
k=1
[ n(k)−1∑
i=1
v(x
Pk−1
j=1 n(j)+i)(Yσr(
Pk−1
j=1 n(j)+i)
− Yσr(
Pk−1
j=1 n(j)+i+1)
)
+v(x
Pk
j=1 n(j))(Yσr(
Pk
j=1 n(j))
− Yσr(
Pk
j=1 n(j)+1)
)
]
=
maxj lj∑
k=1
[ n(k)−1∑
i=1
φCr(x
Pk−1
j=1 n(j)+i)(Yσr(
Pk−1
j=1 n(j)+i)
− Yσr(
Pk−1
j=1 n(j)+i+1)
)+
φCr(x
Pk
j=1 n(j))(Yσr(
Pk
j=1 n(j))
− Yσr(
Pk
j=1 n(j)+1)
)
]
where φCr is the payoff vector corresponding to Cr, for which φ
Cr ≡ v on Cr. But this
contradicts the fact that φCr is element of the Weber set. Hence, φ ∈ W(v). 
We are now in position to give the main result of the paper.
Theorem 5 For any convex multichoice game v, the following holds.
(i) C(v) =W(v), or equivalently Ext(C(v)) =M(v)
(ii) PCF (v) = PW(v), or equivalently Ext(PC(v)) = PM(v).
Proof: By Th. 2, we know that for a convex game v, any vertex of the Weber set is
a vertex of the core. Since these are convex sets, and since the core is included in the
Weber set by Th. 4, it follows that the vertices of the two sets coincide. For the precore,
using Th. 1 and 3 similarly proves the result. 
Fig. 1 summarizes most of the results on the core and the Weber set.
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CWPCPW C =W
PCF = PW
Figure 1: Relations between the core and the Weber set: general case (left), convex case
(right)
5 Comparison with previous works
Previous works on the core of multichoice games have been done mainly by van den
Nouweland et al. [14], and Faigle [5]. We summarize their approach and make a compar-
ison with ours.
5.1 Core of van den Nouweland
Van den Nouweland et al. define the core of multichoice game as follows. Let v be a
multichoice game on L. A level payoff vector on L is a function δ :M → R, where, for all
i ∈ N and k ∈ Li \ {0}, δ(i, k) denotes the increase in worth for player i corresponding
to a change of activity from level k − 1 to level k by this player, and δ(i, 0) = 0 for all
i ∈ N .
To each δ we can associate bijectively an additive game on L by
φδ(x) :=
∑
i∈N
xi∑
k=0
δ(i, k), ∀x ∈ L.
Due to Remark 1, φδ can be considered as a payoff vector in our sense. Hence, in the
sequel we will use indifferently the level payoff vector δ or its corresponding additive game
φδ.
A level payoff vector δ on L is called efficient for v if φδ(⊤) = v(⊤), and it is called
level increase rational for v if, for all i ∈ N and k ∈ Li \{0}, δ(i, k) is at least the increase
in worth that player i can obtain when he works alone and changes his activity from level
k − 1 to level k, i.e.
δ(i, k) ≥ v(0−i, ki)− v(0−i, (k − 1)i).
Definition 10 [14] A level payoff vector on L is a level imputation of v if it is efficient
and level increase rational for v.
We denote the set of level imputations of the games v by I(v).
Definition 11 [14] The core CVDN(v) of the game v consists of all δ ∈ I(v) that satisfy
φδ(x) ≥ v(x) for all x ∈ L.
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Let φδ ∈ CVDN(v),, then it satisfies φδ(x) ≥ v(x), φδ(⊤) = v(⊤). Therefore φδ ∈
PC(v), which proves that CVDN(v) ⊆ PC(v).
Definition 12 [14] For a multichoice game v, the set Cmin(v) of minimal core elements
is the set of least elements of the core:
Cmin(v) := {φδ ∈ CVDN(v) | there is no φδ′ ∈ CVDN(v) such that δ
′ 6= δ and
φδ′(x) ≤ φδ(x), ∀x ∈ L}.
Let L(v) = {φ ∈ RM | φ(0−i, ki)− φ(0−i, (k − 1)i) ≥ v(0−i, ki)− v(0−i, (k − 1)i), k =
1, . . . , li}. We have clearly: PC(v) ∩ L(v) = CVDN(v).
In summary, we have the following inclusions.
Proposition 6 For any multichoice game v on L, the following holds.
C(v) ∩ L(v) ⊆ CVDN(v) = PC(v) ∩ L(v) ⊆ PC(v).
Van den Nouweland et al. define the Weber set as follows. An admissible ordering
(for v) is a bijection pi :M∗ → {1, . . . ,
∑
i∈N li} satisfying
pi(i, k) < pi(i, k + 1), i ∈ N, k = 1, . . . , li − 1.
This amounts to define a maximal chain {⊥, x1pi, . . . , x
P
i∈N li
pi } in L, where xkpi is the element
of L obtained after k steps according to pi. The marginal vector wpi associated to pi is
defined as
wpi(i,k) = v(x
pi(i,k)
pi )− v(x
pi(i,k)−1
pi ), (i, k) ∈M
∗.
Considering wpi as a level payoff vector, we can associate the additive game φwpi . The
level payoff vector is a level imputation if the game is monotonic after zero-normalization
(i.e., such that v(0−i, ki) = 0, for all i, k). Then the Weber set in the sense of van den
Nouweland is defined as the convex hull of all marginal vectors.
In fact, φwpi is exactly our additive game φ
C, where C is the maximal chain induced
by pi. Hence, WVDN(v) = PW(v).
Van den Nouweland et al. [14] showed that if v is convex, thenWVDN(v) is the convex
hull of Cmin. Comparing to our results, we have proven that PW(v) is the convex hull
of the extreme points of PC(v). This shows that the extreme points of PC(v) are all
minimal core elements. However, not all minimal core elements are extreme points as the
following example shows.
Example 6: (borrowed from [14, Ex. 3]) Let us consider a game with 2
players, l1 = 2, l2 = 1, and a convex game v defined as follows:
x v(x) x v(x)
(0,0) 0 (0,1) 0
(1,0) 0 (1,1) 2
(2,0) 0 (2,1) 3
There are 3 maximal chains: C1 := {(0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 0), (2, 1)},
C2 := {(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (2, 1)} and C3 := {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (2, 1)}, lead-
ing to the three following additive games φ1, φ2, φ3:
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φ1(1, 0) = 0 φ2(1, 0) = 0 φ3(1, 0) = 2
φ1(2, 0) = 0 φ2(2, 0) = 1 φ3(2, 0) = 3
φ1(0, 1) = 3 φ2(0, 1) = 2 φ3(0, 1) = 0
Clearly, these are all minimal core elements as expected. But the following
additive game is a minimal core element:
φ4(1, 0) = 1, φ4(2, 0) = 2, φ4(0, 1) = 1
and is not among the three additive games of PM(v).
This shows that Cmin is unnecessarily large, since it contains elements which are not
extreme points. Finally, we prove the following.
Proposition 7 For any convex game v, PCF (v) ⊆ CVDN(v). In other words, any convex
combination of marginal worth vectors is level increase rational for a convex game v.
Proof: Consider φC in PM(v), for some maximal chain C = {⊥, x1, . . . , x
Pn
j=1lj = ⊤}.
Using previous notations, the associated chain vector is ψC , with
ψCi = v(x
i)− v(xi−1), i = 1, . . . ,
n∑
j=1
lj.
Consider ij in 1, . . . ,
∑n
j=1 lj such that x
ij
j = k and x
ij−1
j = k − 1 for some level k. By
convexity of v, we have:
ψCij = v(x
ij )− v(xij−1) ≥ v(0−j, kj)− v(0−j, (k − 1)j).
This being true for each ij , we have proven that the level payoff vector ψ
C is level increase
rational. Since convex combinations preserves the property of level increase rationality,
and since PCF (v) is the convex hull of PM(v) by Th. 5, the proof is complete. 
5.2 Core of Faigle
U. Faigle introduced the core of games with restricted cooperation in [5]. He proposes a
general model for a cooperative game on a finite set N of players, without assuming that
every coalition S ⊆ N of players is feasible, and thus takes into account the situation, for
instance, where some players may join a coalition only if some other players have already
joined the coalition.
Definition 13 [5] A (finite) game with restricted cooperation is a quadruple
γ = {N,F, v, v0} where N is the finite set of players, F a nonempty collection of subsets
of N called feasible coalitions, v : F → R the value function, with v(∅) = 0, and v0 ∈ R
the total value of the game γ. If v and v0 are nonnegative, γ is a positive game.
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A solution of the game γ is a fair distribution of its value v0 among the players. As
usual, they therefore define the core CFaigle(v) of the game γ to consist of all undominated
pre-imputations, i.e. vectors φ ∈ RN such that:
(i)
∑
s∈A φs ≥ v(A) for all A ∈ F ,
(ii)
∑
s∈N φs = v0.
The usual way to define the restricted set of coalitions F is to introduce a partial order
≤ on N [6]. Let P = (N,≤) denote this partially ordered set of players. The relation
i ≤ j indicates that the presence of j enforces the presence of i in any coalition S ⊆ N .
Hence, a (feasible) coalition of P is a subset S ⊆ N such that s ∈ S and t ≤ s yield t ∈ S
for all s, t ∈ N . Thus unions and intersections of coalitions are again coalitions, while
complements of coalitions may fail to have this property. By Γ(P ) we denote the vector
space of all cooperative games on P .
Let v be a multichoice game on L, keeping our previous notations, and consider as a set
of virtual players the disjoint union N ′ = ∪i∈N (Li \ {0i}), with the ordering ≤ defined by
n1 ≤ n2 if n1, n2 ∈ Li for some i and n1 ≤ n2 in Li. There is a one-to-one correspondence
between the participation profiles x ∈ L =
∏n
i=1 Li and the feasible coalitions on N
′ in
the sense of Faigle: the non-zero components of such an x may be interpreted as the
maximal elements of a feasible coalition of N ′ and conversely, while the zero-vector 0 ∈ L
corresponds to the empty feasible coalition of N ′. Hence any multichoice game can be
considered as a particular game with precedence constraints, on a virtual set of players
N ′.
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ L \ {⊥}, and consider S :=
{
s ∈ N ′ | ∃i ∈ N, s.t. s ≤ xi
}
.
Then S is a feasible coalition of N ′. Taking any φ ∈ RN
′
belonging to CFaigle, we have∑
s∈S φs ≥ v(x) and
∑
s∈N ′ φs = v(⊤), which entails that the corresponding additive
game Φ belongs to PC(v), and reciprocally. This proves PC(v) = CFaigle(v).
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